On May 11, 2026, Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIM) officially launched the ‘Supplier Pre-Verification Channel’ (Supplier Pre-Verification Channel) on the SABER platform, requiring all Chinese manufacturers exporting to Saudi Arabia to deploy a real-time SASO certification status query API interface (path: /api/saso-status) under the root domain of their official websites. This measure directly affects exporters in product categories subject to mandatory SASO certification, including electromechanical equipment, household appliances, lighting products, low-voltage electrical appliances, children’s products, and certain building materials, as their certification status will be directly linked to SABER registration credibility and customs clearance efficiency.
Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIM) announced on May 11, 2026 that the SABER platform would fully open the ‘Supplier Pre-Verification Channel’. According to the official requirements, all Chinese manufacturers exporting to Saudi Arabia must deploy a standardized API endpoint (/api/saso-status) in the root directory of their own official website domain for automatic access by Saudi importers, customs brokers, and Saudi customs systems, enabling real-time retrieval of the validity period of SASO certifications, applicable product scope, and regulatory classification information for products under the supplier’s name. Suppliers that fail to complete the deployment as required will have their SABER registration automatically marked by the system as ‘low-credibility suppliers’.
Reason for impact: The overwhelming majority of Chinese manufacturers exporting to Saudi Arabia fall under this category and are the certificate holders of SASO certifications. The impact is mainly reflected in the following: SABER registration status will be directly constrained by the API deployment status of the official website; failure to deploy will hinder order fulfillment, especially by easily triggering secondary verification during buyer factory audits, goods inspections, or customs clearance inspections.
Reason for impact: As the intermediary link connecting Chinese factories and Saudi end buyers, if the factories they represent fail to complete the API deployment, the entire order chain will be shown as abnormal in the SABER system. The impact is mainly reflected in the following: importers may refuse to accept goods from suppliers whose qualifications do not meet the standards; customs brokers will raise review thresholds and extend document processing cycles.
Reason for impact: For enterprises providing services such as SABER registration, SASO certification agency services, and compliance consulting, the integrity of customer deliverables now adds a new technical implementation dimension. The impact is mainly reflected in the following: merely completing the SASO certificate application is no longer sufficient to satisfy the compliance loop; it is necessary to coordinate with customers to complete official website interface development, testing, and go-live verification, substantially extending service boundaries.
Reason for impact: Chinese enterprises with independent export qualifications and directly registered SABER accounts are both the policy targets and the responsible entities. The impact is mainly reflected in the following: once marked by the system as a ‘low-credibility supplier’, they may be downgraded on Saudi procurement platforms (such as Saudi Procurement Portal), affecting new customer reach and bidding eligibility.
What deserves more attention at present is whether MIM will release API interface specifications (such as request methods, response fields, authentication mechanisms, and error code definitions) as well as a testing sandbox environment. Enterprises should continuously track the SABER official developer portal (Developer Portal) or notification channels designated by MIM to avoid deployment failures caused by deviations in technical parameters.
From the analysis, the policy clearly targets ‘Chinese manufacturers’ and their ‘own official websites’. If an enterprise exports through ODM/OEM arrangements, but the SASO certificate registration entity is an overseas company, then the Chinese factory may not necessarily be mandatorily required to deploy; conversely, if the Chinese factory is the SASO certificate holder and owns an independent official website, then it falls within the scope of application regardless of whether it exports directly. Enterprises must verify the consistency of their registered entity in SASO certificates and the SABER system.
From an industry perspective, categories such as lighting, small household appliances, power adapters, and LED drivers, which have long frequently triggered SASO recalls or customs interceptions, are expected to become key targets for Saudi customs scrutiny. Enterprises may first complete API data integration for product families corresponding to their main export models, and then gradually cover the full SKU range, reducing the pressure of one-time transformation.
Observations show that small and medium-sized manufacturing enterprises generally lack experience in API development and HTTPS security configuration. At present, this is more appropriately understood as a cross-functional collaborative task: the IT department needs to confirm the compatibility of the official website architecture, the quality/compliance department needs to provide structured data sources for SASO certificates, and the foreign trade department needs to coordinate with importers to confirm expected invocation frequency and response timeliness. Where necessary, technical service providers with SABER system integration experience may be introduced, but it must be made clear that they only provide deployment support and do not replace the enterprise as the responsible data entity.
Observably, this mandatory deployment is not merely a technical upgrade, but a critical step by Saudi Arabia to extend the product compliance management chain forward to the Chinese manufacturing end. It is more like a structural signal—marking Saudi Arabia’s shift from ‘certificate result review’ to ‘source data credibility verification’. Analysis shows that this move is intended to compress the room for operations involving false certifications, expired certificates, and certificates used beyond their scope, but the actual implementation effect still depends on the automated invocation coverage of Saudi customs systems and the exception response mechanism. The industry needs to continue observing whether there will be concentrated cases of customs clearance delays caused by undeployed APIs from the second half of 2026 onward, and whether MIM will expand this mechanism to other regulatory platforms (such as SALEEM).

Conclusion: This policy is not a temporary administrative reminder, but an underlying adjustment to the operating logic of the SABER platform. Its industry significance lies in transforming Chinese manufacturers’ official websites from brand display windows into statutory data interfaces for Saudi market access. At present, it is more appropriately understood as a definite compliance obligation rather than an optional optimization item; enterprises should promote it through a parallel ‘technology + compliance’ approach to avoid oversimplifying it as a task solely for the IT department.
Information source notes:
Main source: SABER platform announcement issued by Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of Industry and Mineral Resources (MIM) on May 11, 2026.
Parts pending continuous observation: MIM has not yet disclosed the specific technical specifications of the API, sandbox testing entry points, or transition period arrangements; the above content is subject to MIM’s subsequent updates.
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